A group of armed people, usually nonstate and organized into an insurgent army or guerrilla force, fighting against outside control of their territory. Insurgents form and build upon prewar political networks (such as political parties, religious associations, or student groups) and mobilize them for war by tying those networks together through new ties of information, obligation, and trust. These ties of information and obligation make up the social base on which insurgents draw their strength, a key distinction from terrorists who use violence to achieve political, even revolutionary, goals but do not rely on political programs and instead aim for mass support and change through political means.
The insurgent’s dilemma, posited by Ucko, is the need to build popular support and secure resources while maintaining military effectiveness in the face of overwhelming state opposition. Traditionally, this was done by amassing a force large enough to overcome the state’s superior firepower. In the 21st century, however, the ability of state forces to rapidly adapt to changing global conditions has forced insurgents to shift their approach.
Integrated groups have a clear organizational structure and carefully coordinated strategy. These groups are typically the most militarily effective and capable of sustaining their resistance over time. Examples include the Tamil Tigers, the Afghan Taliban, and Hamas. Disloyal local units can undermine vanguard groups by pulling away from them, as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar experienced with his own Pakistani Taliban group from 1995 to 1996. Integrated groups can also be splintered by the state, as it did with the Libyan National Liberation Front in 2011. Disintegrated armed groups are often incapable of making a smooth transition from war to peace.
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